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Abstract. For each cooperative n-person game v and each 
h 9 { 1, 2 . . . . .  n !, let v h be the average worth of coalitions 
of size h and v~ the average worth of coalitions of size h 
which do not contain player is N. The paper introduces the 
notion of a proportional average worth game (or PAW- 
game), i.e., the zero-normalized game v for which there 
exist numbers ch9 ~ such that D,-v~=ch (vn_l-vi_]) for all 
h 9 {2, 3 . . . . .  n -  1 }, and is N. The notion of average worth 
is used to prove a formula for the Shapley value of a PAW- 
game. It is shown that the Shapley value, the value repre- 
senting the center of the imputation set, the egalitarian non- 
separable contribution value and the egalitarian on-aver- 
age contribution value of a PAW-game are collinear. The 
class of PAW-games contains trictly the class of k-coali- 
tional games possessing the collinearity property dis- 
cussed by Driessen and Funaki (1991). Finally, it is illus- 
trated that the unanimity games and the landlord games 
are PAW-games. 
Zusammenfassung. Sei ve in  kooperatives n-Personen- 
spiel und sei h 9 { 1, 2 . . . . .  n }. Mit v h bezeichnen wir die 
mittlere Auszahlung aller Koalitionen der GraBe h und mit 
v~ die mittlere Auszahlung aller Koalitionen der Gr6Be h, 
die den Spieler i eN  nicht enthalten. In dieser Arbeit, 
ftihren wir den Begriff des Spieles mit proportionaler 
mittlerer Auszahlung (oder PMA-Spiel) ein. Diese sind 
null-reduzierte Spiele v, fiir die Zahlen ch9 ~ existieren, 
sodag die Beziehung i Vh--Vh=C h (Vn_l--V~z_l) ffir jedes h 9  {2, 
3 . . . . .  n -  1 } und ie N gilt. Der Begriff der mittleren Aus- 
zahlung wird dann benutzt, um eine Formel ftir den Sha- 
pley-Wert der PMA-Spiele abzuleiten. Wit zeigen, dab der 
Shapley-Wert, und die durch das Zentrum der Imputation- 
smenge, die gleichmfiBigen icht-separablen Beitrage, 
bzw. gleichmfiBigen nicht-gemittelten Beitrfige definierten 
Werte der PMA-Spiele kollinear sind. Die Klasse aller 
PMA-Spiele enthfilt im strengen Sinne die Klasse aller k- 
Koalitionsspiele, die die Kollinearit~tseigenschaft ben 
(Driessen und Funaki, 1991). Schlieglich zeigen wir, dab 
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die Einstimmigkeitsspiele und die Grundbesitzerspiele 
auch PMA-Spiele sind. 
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1. Introduction 
In the framework of cooperative game theory, many one- 
point solution concepts called values have been proposed. 
For specific lasses of cooperative games, some of the one- 
point solutions possess interesting eometric relation- 
ships, for example three of the relevant one-point solutions 
are collinear, i.e., lie on the same line. Driessen and Fu- 
naki (1991) studied the collinearity between the Shapley 
value, the egalitarian on-separable contribution value 
(called ENSC-value) and the value representing the cen- 
ter of the imputation set (called C1S-value) for the class of 
cooperative games called the k-coalitional games. Here the 
collinearity of three values expresses that the correspond- 
ing one-point solutions for a certain type of a cooperative 
game lie on the same line. 
In the present paper, we introduce a class of games 
called proportional average worth games (PAW-games), 
which strictly contains the subclass of those k-coalitional 
games for which the three above-mentioned values are col- 
linear. An n-person game is said to be a proportional av- 
erage worth game, if for any nontrivial coalition size, the 
differences of the so-called average worth per player are 
proportional to the differences of the average worth per 
player with respect to the coalition size n-1. The notion of 
average worth was used by Dragan (1992) to present an 
average per capita formula for the Shapley value. We show 
that in general, beside the Shapley value, the ENSC-value, 
the CIS-value, as well as the egalitarian on-average con- 
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tribution value (called ENAC-value), recently introduced 
by Driessen and Funaki (1993 a), can all be reformulated 
in terms of average worth with respect to particular coali- 
tion sizes, namely (n-  1)-person, 1-person, and (n-2)-per- 
son coalitions, respectively. As a matter of fact, the notion 
of average worth is our main tool in establishing the col- 
linearity of three of the four values on the class of PAW- 
games. The collinearity results concerning the k-coali- 
tional games obtained by Driessen and Funaki (1991) are 
therefore reproved as special cases of the same properties 
for PAW-games. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 deals with 
the formal definitions of the four values in question, the 
notion of average worth and the reformulations of all four 
values in terms of average worth. Two examples how that 
there are games in which the Shapley value is collinear 
with the ENSC-value and CIS-value, but the Shapley value 
is not collinear with the ENAC-value and CIS-value, and 
games in which there is no collinearity at all. In Sect. 3, 
we introduce the PAW-games and prove that for such 
games the Shapley value is collinear with the ENSC-value 
and CIS-value and also with the ENAC-value and CIS- 
value. For four-person games the collinearity is even a suf- 
ficient condition for being PAW-games, afact which is not 
true in general, as shown by a five-person game discussed 
in the previous section. The unanimity games are PAW- 
games, but the sum of two PAW-games is not in general a 
PAW-game. Finally, Section 4 is devoted to the class of k- 
coalitional n-person games. The relationship between k- 
coalitional games and PAW-games is elucidated in the 
sense that each k-coalitional game for which the colline- 
arity property between the Shapley value, the ENSC-value 
and the CIS-value holds, belongs to the class of PAW- 
games. An example shows that the latter class is strictly 
larger. The paper ends with the study of the class of land- 
lord games; it is illustrated that the landlord games are 
PAW-games, but not necessarily k-coalitional games. 
2. Notions and solution concepts 
Let N be a finite set whose elements are called players. A 
cooperative or transferable utility game with player set N 
is a real-valued function v: 2 N ~ ~, on the set 2 N of all 
subsets of N, called coalitions. The worth v (S) of coali- 
tion SeN in the game v represents he total profits that the 
members of S can achieve due to their cooperative be- 
haviour. It is a standard requirement that the empty coali- 
tion has no worth, i.e., v (~):=0. The number of players in 
a coalition S is denoted by ISI. As usual, the players in the 
game are numbered in such a way that N--{ 1, 2, 3 . . . . .  n}, 
where n=lNI, n>3. The class of all cooperative n-person 
games is denoted by G". 
The solution part of cooperative game theory focuses 
on the essential problem how to divide the overall profits 
v (N) of the grand coalition among the players of the n-per- 
son game v. Four one-point solution concepts for cooper- 
ative games will be considered in this paper. The most 
well-known one-point solution concept has been intro- 
duced axiomatically by Shapley (1953). The classical for- 
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mula for the Shapley value payoff to any player ie N in an 
n-person game v is given by (cf. [13]) 
Shi(v)= ~, (n!)-l(s-1)!(n-s)![v(S)-v(S\{i})] (2.1) 
SeN; ieS 
where s=lSI for any SeN. As the Shapley value has many 
nice properties, making it perhaps the most popular solu- 
tion, its computation may be regarded as a central prob- 
lem. All algorithms (cf. [8], [10]) have the complexities 
O (n 9 2~), which makes the computation of the Shapley 
value tough for large n. For the purpose of simplification 
of computation, we compare the Shapley value concept 
with three easier computable solution concepts. The three 
one-point solution concepts have similar interpretations in 
the sense that the remaining overall profits are divided 
equally, given that each player is already paid some spec- 
ified individual contribution. The individual contribution 
of any player i~N in an n-person game v may be deter- 
mined in one of the next three ways: 
1. player i's individual worth v ({i}); 
2. player i's separable (or marginal) contribution from an 
(n-1)-person coalition to the grand coalition, which is 
given by 
SCi(v):=v(N)-v(N~{i}); (2.2) 
3. player i's average contribution from (n-2)-person co- 
alitions to the grand coalition, which is given by 
aCi(v):=v(N)-(n-2) -I Y~ v(N\{i,j}). (2.3) 
j~N\{i} 
For an interpretation of the expression in the right hand 
side of (2.3) as some average of marginal contributions of 
pairs of players including the relevant player i, we refer to 
Driessen and Funaki (1993 a). 
Subsequently, the egalitarian division of the surplus of 
the overall profits gives rise to three one-point solution 
concepts of the same kind, the value representing the cen- 
ter of the imputation set (CIS-value), the egalitarian on- 
separable contribution value (ENSC-value), and the egal- 
itarian non-average contribution value ( ENA C-value), re- 
spectively. The CIS-value of an n-person game v is for- 
mally defined by 
CISi(v):= v({i})+n-l lv(N)- ~" v({J}) (2.4) 
for all ie N; obviously, this value represents he center of 
the imputation set of the game v given by 
I (v) := { x e ~n l y~jeN xj = v( N) and xi >- v( {i} ) f~ all i e N}" 
Similarly, the ENSC-value and the ENAC-value are for- 
mally defined by 
ENSCi(v):=SCi(v)+n-l lv(N)- ~"jeN SCj(v)], (2.5) 
ENACi(v):= ACi(v)+n-llv(N)- ~"j~N ACj(v)] (2.6) 
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for all ieN. Note that the computation of the CIS-value, 
the ENSC-value and the ENAC-value requires beside the 
worth of the grand coalition, only the data of the 1-person, 
(n-1)-person and (n-2)-person coalitions, respectively. 
The next theorem states important results for the four val- 
ues, that will be used throughout the paper; they will be 
expressed in terms of so-called average worth and the new 
formulas will replace (2.1)- (2.6). 
Definition 2.1. Let ve G n, where n> 3. 
(i) For each he { 1, 2 . . . . .  n}, let Fh:={SIScN, ISl=h} be 
the set of all coalitions of size h, and define the average 
worth of coalitions of size h by 
Vh :---- Z v (S) .  (2.7) 
S~F~, 
(ii) For each he {1, 2 . . . . .  n - l}  and each ieN, let 
F~:={ SIScN, ISl=h, i~ S} be the set of all coalitions of size 
h not containing player i, and define the average worth 
of coalitions of size h not containing player i by 
v~, := 2 v(S). (2.8) 
i For convenience, put v,:=O for all ie N. 
Theorem 2.2. Let ve G n, n> 3, and ie N. We have 
(i) Shi(v)= L h-l(vh-v~) (2.9) 
h=l 
(ii) CIS  i (v)  = n -1 v n + (n - 1) (v 1 - v~ ) (2.10)  
(iii) ENSCi (v) = n -I v~ + (v,-i - vi-1 ) (2.11) 
(iv) ENACi (v) = n-lv~ + (n - 2) -l(n - 1) (v~-2- v/-2 ).(2.12) 
Proof (i) Distinguishing coalitions with different sizes and 
coalitions containing player i or not, we deduce from the 
classical formula (2.1) for the Shapley value that 
( 1-1 Shi(v)= ~ ~, h -1 [v(S)-v(S\{i})]  
h=l S~Fh;ieS 
= ~ h-1 2 v(S) 
h=l SzF h ;i~S 
- ~ h -1 ~. v(S\{i}) 
h=2 SeF h ;ieS 
( 1 = h- Xv(S) -  Xv(S)  
,,=, kh) Ls r,, I 
n - I  
h=2 \ / T~F/ I 
-1 n n 
= - Z v (S)  h (S) h 
h=l h h~ \'~J s~ 
(m _ ~(m+l )_  1 n m=l +1 T 
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Substituting (29 and (2.8) respectively, we obtain 
Sh i(v)= ~ h -l v h 
h=l 
--~h=l h-1 +(h+l)-~ h+l  "s 
(hT =~ h- l vh_~ h- 1 n 1 ~ v(S) h=l h=l SeF~I 
n n-1 
=~_., h- lvh--~,  h-lvih = h-l(vh-v~,). 
h=l h=l h=l 
This proves part (i). 
(ii) The proof of this part is left to the reader. 
(iii) From (2.5), (2.2) and (2.7), (2.8) applied to h=n-1, 
we derive 
ENSCi (v) = n -~ v( N) + v( N) - v( N\{i} )
-n - l  ~, [v(N)-v(N\{j})]  
jeN 
= n -1 v(N)+n -1 ~, v (N \{ j} ) -  v(N\{i}) 
jeN 
i 
.= n -1 Vn q- Vn_ l -- Vn_ 1 9 
(iv) From (2.6), (2.3) and (2.7), (2.8) applied to h = n -2 ,  
we derive 
ENACi(v)=n -1 v (N)+v(N) - (n -2 )  -l ~, v(N\{i,k}) 
keN\{i} 
- -n -12  Iv ( / ) - (n -2 )  -1 Z v( i \{ j , k}) t  
jeN  L keN\{j} J 
=n- lv (N) - (n -2 )  -1 ~, v(S) 
i Se~l- 2
+n- l (n -2 ) - I  ~] ~ v(N\{j,k}) 
]eg keN\{j} 
= n -1 v n - (n - 2) -1 (n - 1) v/_2 
+2n- l (n -2 )  -1 ~ v(S) 
S~F,,_2 
= n -1 vn - (n - 2) -1 (n - 1) V/_2 
+ (n - 2) -1 (n - 1) Vn_ 2 
i = n -1 v n +(n-2)  - l(n-1)(vn_ 2-Vn_2). 
The form (2.9) of the Shapley value formula has been in- 
troduced and proved by Dragan (1992). Because this av- 
erage per capita formula for the Shapley value is our most 
important tool in this paper, we gave its proof here. A sim- 
ilar, but different average per capita formula for the Sha- 
pley value was used by Peleg (1992) in some game theo- 
retic approach to voting theory by count and account. The 
ENSC-value and the CIS-value are well known concepts 
in the game theoretic literature (cf. [2], [3], [4], [6], [7], 
[9], [11], [14]). The ENAC-value has been introduced by 
Driessen and Funaki (1993a), who presented three moti- 
vations for the study of this value9 The formula (2.12) for 
the ENAC-value, which is the sum of the egalitarian divi- 
sion of the overall profits and some part of the difference 
between two average worth with respect o (n-2)-person 
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coalitions, provides us another motivation to concentrate 
on the ENAC-value, next to the ENSC-value and the CIS- 
value. 
The main result of Theorem 2.2 that all four values can 
be expressed in terms of the average worth v h and v~, 
l<h<n, i~N, suggests us to investigate the collinearity of 
three of the four values. In the next sections, we shall pro- 
vide two types of sufficient conditions on the game so that 
the one-point solutions according to the Shapley value, the 
ENSC-value (or ENAC-value) and the CIS-value are col- 
linear (i.e., lie on the same line). The importance of the 
collinearity property of three values (including the Sha- 
pley value) may be twofold. On the one hand the colline- 
arity property may simplify (to some extent) the compu- 
tation of the Shapley value (its simplification of computa- 
tion, however, depends trongly on the complexity of the 
verification of the underlying condition guaranteeing the 
collinearity property of values), on the other the colline- 
arity property is interesting on its own for the sake of com- 
parison of values (e.g., to conclude which of the three one- 
point solutions is the best or the worst for any of the 
players). 
In the context of colliuearity properties of several val- 
ues, we may restrict ourselves, without loss of generality, 
to the class G~' of zero-normalized n-person games defined 
by G~:={ w G"I v ({ i})=0 for all i ~N}. Indeed, the process 
of zero-normalization transforms an arbitrary n-person 
game v into the corresponding zero-normalized game 
w ~ G n given by 
w(S):= v(S) -~ v({j}) forall SeN, 
j~S 
and it is straightforward to verify that each of the four val- 
ues behaves nicely, i.e., 
~(w)=G(v)-(v({ 1}), v({2}) . . . . .  v({n})) 
for any value ~e {Sh, ENSC, ENAC, CIS}. Therefore, the 
collinearity properties will not be affected by zero-normal- 
ization. Henceforward, we shall frequently use the results 
listed in the next corollary. 
Corollary 2.3. Let w Gj , n23, and i ~ N. We have 
(i) Shi(v)= ~ h-l(Vh-V~,) (2.13) 
h=2 
(ii) CIS i (v )=n 1 Vn (2.14) 
(iii) ENSCi(v)-CISi(v)=v~_I-v~, l (2.15) 
(iv) ENACi(v)-CISi(v)=(n-2) -1 (n- l )  (v,, 2-v~,_2). (2.16) 
We conclude this section with two examples which will 
illustrate the lack of collinearity. Notice that for v 9 Gg, we 
have always 
Sh (v) =-~ENSC(v) +~CIS (v) and ENAC (v) = CIS (v), 
so that we should consider games with at least four players 
to show the lack of collinearity. 
v ({1,2})=v({3,4})=0, v({1,3})=v({2,3})=1, 
v ({1, 4})=v ({2, 4})=2, v ({1, 2, 3})=1, 
v ({1, 2, 4})=v ({1, 3, 4})=v ({2, 3, 4})=2, v (N)=3. 
Straightforward calculations yield all average worth as 
well as all differences of average worth: 
v2 : 1, = v2 = 1, : 4 ,  _2  
- -7 '  
v2 - v~ = O, O, -~ 3 '3 '  
2 :v3  =2, @=1,  V3 =7,  V3 I =V3 
4 '  4 '  4 '  
v4 = 3, for i = 1, 2, 3, 4, respectively. 
From this and the new formulas (2.13)-(2.16), we get 
3 CIS (v)=T(1, 1, 1, 1),ENSC (v)=89 (1, 1, 1,3), 
1 1 Sh (v) =g(4,  4, 3, 7), ENAC(v)=g (3, 3, 1, 5). 
We can check that there is no collinearity between the Sha- 
pley value and the ENSC-value (or ENAC-value) and the 
CIS-value; an exact explanation of the failure of such col- 
linearities will be provided in Sect. 4. Note that the four 
values are coplanar, because we have Sh (v)=~ [ENAC 
(v) + ENSC (v) + C1S (v)]. In the next example we shall have 
only one of the two collinearities. 
Example 2.5. Consider the zero-normalized 5-person 
game v given by 
v({4,5}) = l ,v (S )=0 forall  SeF2, Sve{4,5 }, 
v({1,2,3})=2, v(S)=1 forall  SeFB, SVe{1, 2, 3}, 
v ({ 1, 2, 3, 4})=4, v ({ 1,2, 3, 5})=5, v ({1, 2, 4, 5})=6, 
v ({1, 3, 4, 5})=7, v ({2, 3, 4, 5})=8, v (N)=10. 
Straightforward calculations yield all average worth as 
well as all differences of average worth: 
V2 = TO' V2 
,15 ,15 ,10 ,10  ~ 
_11  1 2 3 4 5 5 
V3 --  ~ ,  V3 = F3 = V~ = l ,  v3 = V3 = , 
9 110 1 I -3  -3  V 3 -V~ = ' 10' 10' 20' 20' 
v4 6, v), 8, v 2 7, v 3 = = = 4=6,  v4=5, v4 5=4, 
V 4 - -  V~ = -2,-1,  0, 1, 2, 
v5 = 10, for i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, respectively. 
From this and the new formulas (2.13)-(2.16), we get 
CIS(v)=(2, 2, 2, 2, 2), ENSC(v)=(O, 1, 2, 3, 4), 
Sh (v) = 88 (6, 7, 8, 9, 10), ENA C (v) = ~ (32, 32, 32, 27, 27). 
We discover easily that the Shapley value, the ENSC-value 
and the CIS-value lie on the same line, because Sh (v)= 
88 3 +TCIS(v); instead the ENAC-value does not lie 
on the same line. 
3. Collinearity of values on the class of PAW-games 
Example 2.4. Consider the zero-normalized 4-person 
game v given by 
Definition 3.1. Let n>3. A game vc G~ is called a pro- 
portional average worth game (or PAW-game) if for all 
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he {2, 3 . . . . .  n -1  } there exist numbers" che ~ such that 
v~,-v~=ch(vn_l-Vi_l) for  all i eN .  (39 
Conditions (3.1) express that for any nontrivial coalition 
size, the differences of the average worth per player are 
proportional to the differences of such averages for the co- 
alition size n-1. 
Clearly, each zero-normalized 3-person game is a PAW- 
game, because (3.1) holds with c2=1. Further, each zero- 
normalized symmetric n-person game v, i.e., v(S)=v(T) 
whenever ISI=ITI, is a PAW-game, since vh= v/, for all ie N, 
all 1 <h<n-1 .  For another type of PAW-games ee Exam- 
ple 3.5. According to the next proposition, a PAW-game 
can also be characterized in terms of the consistency of a 
certain system of quadratic equations9 
Proposition 3.2. Let  n>_3. A game w G~ is a PAW-game 
if and only if there exist numbers (he ~, h e { 2, 3 . . . . .  n -  1 }, 
and numbers d i, ieN,  such that cn_lr and 
i - i Vh--Vh=Ch d for  all ieN,  all 2<h<_n-l .  (3.2) 
lO1 
lows from (3.1) that vh-v~=O for all ieN,  all 2<<_h<n-1 
and so, the Shapley value payoff to any player ie Nreduces 
to  Sh i (v) = n-1 Vn = ENSC i (v) = CIS i (v). This coincidence of 
the three solution concepts with the egalitarian division 
rule of the overall profits is interpreted as a case of degen- 
erated collinearity; in fact, we have also ENACiv)=CIS iv). 
Now, we shall give the interesting properties of the PAW- 
games which motivated us in introducing and studying this 
class of games9 
Theorem 3.3. Let ve G~) be a PAW-game such that condi- 
tions (3.1) hold. We have 
IEn-1 1 (i) Sh i (v) : n -1 1t~-2 v,, + h -1Ch (v~-i - v,~ 1) 
i 
for  all i e N 
(ii) The collinearity property holds with respect to Sh, 
ENSC and CIS, i.e., 
n-1 
Sh (v) = p ENSC(v)  + (1 - p) CIS(v), where p = ~, h -~ ch 
h=2 
Proof  Suppose that v e G~is a PAW-game, i.e., (3,1) holds. 
Then, (3.2) also holds by choosing d i=vn_ l -v i  I for all 
ie N, (,,_l= 1 and gh=Ch for all 2<h<n-2 .  To prove the con- 
verse implication, suppose that (3.2) holds. In particular, 
i - d i fo ra l l i eN ,  whereg~_l~O. Now, wehavevn- l -Vn- l=cn 1 
it follows that 
vh-v~=((~ 1) -1 (h(v~-i-v~, 1) for all i~N, all 2<<_h<n-1. 
So, (3.2) implies (3.1); this establishes the equivalence of 
(3.1) and (3.2). 
Let us give some remarks about his characterization f 
a zero-normalized n-person PAW-game. The system (3.2) 
has n (n-2) quadratic equations in the 2n-2  unknowns 6h, 
2 < h < n -  1, and dg, ie N, whereas the left hand sides of (3.2) 
are determined by the data of the game v. Consider the 
quadratic subsystem of (3.2) for a fixed coalition size h, 
namely Vh-Vih=6h d i for all ieN.  In case that all left hand 
sides are zero, we take gh=0 and the unknowns d i, ieN,  
remain arbitrary. In case that there are nonzero left hand 
sides, we should have 6hr and the unknowns d i, ie N, are 
determined by di=(~h) 1 (Vh_Vih) for all i~ N, where ch re- 
mains arbitrary. Particularly, each such subsystem of (3.2) 
should be consistent with the special subsystem of (3.2) 
given by di=(g~_l) -1 (Vn_l-V ~ 1) for all i~N. In other 
words, the consistency of two such subsystems requires 
that the corresponding ratio Ch(Cn_l) -1 is uniquely deter- 
mined by the ratios (vh--vih) (vn_rv'~_l) -1, ieN,  provided 
that the denominator is not zero9 If the consistency is met, 
then one of the numbers Ch, 2<h<n-1 ,  is usually unde- 
termined and it is standard to put g~ 1 = 1. 
An important observation is that the collinearity prop- 
erty with respect to Sh, ENSC and CIS may hold although 
the game is not a PAW-game. Indeed, for the game v of 
Example 2.5 conditions (39 can not be met because 
3 , 3 / V4--V 4 :0  and 1,3-v 3 = ]-~0, hence this game is not a PAW- 
game, but the three above-mentioned values are collinear. 
Note that if a PAW-game ve G~ satisfies vn_l-vi~_l=O 
for all is N, or equivalently ENSC(v)= CIS(v), then it fol- 
(iii) Let n > 4 and ENAC (v) r CIS (v). Then, the collinear- 
ity property holds" with respect o Sh, ENAC and CIS, i.e., 
(n -2 )p  
Sh(v) = )" ENAC(v)  + (1 - 7) CIS(v), where 7 - 
(n - 1) c,,_2 
Proof  From formulas (2.13)- (2.15) and conditions (3.1) 
we derive that for all i eN  
n--1 
Shi iv)  = n I v~ + ~ h -1 (vt, - vii,) 
h=2 
= n -1 vn + h -1 ch (v,,-i - v,,-1 )
= CISi (v) + p[ENSCi (v) - C1Si (v)] 
= p ENSCi (v) + (1 - p) CISi (v). 
This proves parts (i) and (ii). In order to prove part (iii), if 
ENACj.(v)e:CISj(v) for some j eN ,  then (2.16) implies 
vn 2-V~_e;e0 and thus, cn 2~0 by applying (3.1) for 
h=n-2 .  Therefore, we have 
ENSCi (v ) -CS[ i (v )  =Vn 1--'9/-1 = (On-2)  -1 (Vn-2--V~z 2) 
=[(n-1)  Cn_e] -1 (n-2) [ENACi(v)-CISi(v)]  
for all ie N. From this and part (ii), we conclude 
Sh (v) = CIS (v) + p [ ENSC (v) -  CIS (v)] 
=CIS(v)+[(n-1)  Cn_e] -1 (n-2) 
9 p [ENA C (v) -  CIS (v)} 
= CIS (v) + y[ENA C (v) -  CIS (v)] 
= yENA C (v) + (1-  7) CIS (v). 
For a 4-person game the converse of part (ii) holds, as 
shown by: 
Proposition 3.4. Let v~ G 4. Then, v is a PAW-game if and 
only if the collinearity property holds with respect to Sh, 
ENSC and CIS. 
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Proof The collinearity property holds if and only if for 
some number 6 we have Sh (v) = CIS(v)+ 6[ENSC (v)- 
CIS (v)]; if n = 4, then this condition could be translated as 
1 i 1 i i "~(V3--1~5)'t-g(V2--V2)=(~(V3--F3) for all ieN, some 6e R, 
or equivalently, 
v2-v~=2 (6 -1 )  (v3-v ~) for all ieN, some 6e R. 
The latter statement is fully equivalent to conditions (3.1). 
Note that such a result for games with more than four 
players is not true, as illustrated by Example 2.5, where 
we presented a 5-person game with the collinearity prop- 
erty which was not a PAW-game. 
Now, we shall show that all unanimity games which are 
zero-normalized are PAW-games. Obviously, these games 
form a basis for the linear space G~ of zero-normalized n- 
person games; however, not every game in G~ is a PAW- 
game, because the class of zero-normalized PAW-games 
is not closed under addition, i.e., the sum of two n-person 
PAW-games is not necessarily a PAW-game. 
Example 3.5. For any TeN, TaO, the unanimity n-person 
game uvis given by uv(S)= 1 if S=T and Ur (S)=0, other- 
wise. Fix TcN, TaO, and write t=lTI. If T=N, then 
u r (S) =0 for all SaN,  ur(N) = 1, so that (UT)h=(UT)~,=O for 
all ieN, all l<h<n-1 ;  hence, the unanimity game UNiS a 
PAW-game, because (3.1) are satisfied. Suppose TveN. For 
any coalition size h, 1 <h<n, we get 
(UT)h = Z UT(S)= [{SeFh[T~SII, 
S~Fh 
and a simple combinatorial computation gives 
(UT )h = n - n-g h h-t i f t<h<n.  
Similarly, for any i e N and any 1 < h < n -  1 we obtain 
= Z uv(S)= {s~FZ r~s} I , 
S~F/, 
and a simple combinatorial computation gives 
(ur)~ 
{(0)  ( ) if eitherieT, l<h<n- l ,  oriffT, l<h<t,  
= ~h 1 -1 ,,h17 t i f i~T, t<h<_n-1.  
From this we conclude that for any i e N and any 1 < h < n -  1, 
we have the results (UT)h--(UT)h=O if 1 <h<t and 
J(~)-I (~_-t,) if ieT, t<h<_n-1, 
(HT)h--(HT)~I : | - t  [n~-l{n-t~ i f i~T , t<h<n 1. 
[,,-,th) ~h ,1 
We notice that if 2<_t<n-1, then any corresponding un- 
animity game u T satisfies (3.2) with (h=0 for all 2<<_h<t, 
( : )  ' (n - t )  n fo ra l l t<h<n- l ,  and 
ct, = h - t  n - t  - - 
d i -n - t  i f ieT ,  ord  i=-~t i f i~T. 
n /it 
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Alternatively, it is straightforward to verify that conditions 
(3.1) hold in case 2<t<n-1 because we have for all i eN  
{~ ) (~, ) i f  l<_h<t, (UT)h--(UT)~ = n71 -1 
- (ur)n-~ if t<h<n-1 .  (blT)n_l i 
In particular, conditions (3.1) hold with ch=0 for all 
l<h<t,  and Ch=(n71) -l (h) for all t<h<n-1, provided 
2<t<n-  1. We conclude that the zero-normalized unanim- 
ity games u T, T<N, with ITl>2 are PAW-games. Accord- 
ing to Theorem 3.3 (ii), the collinearity property holds, 
that is Sh (ur)= CIS (ur) + p [ENSC (ur) -  CIS (ur)], where 
pe N is determined by 
p= ~ h -l c h= ~ h -1 = t -1. 
h=2 h=t 
The latter equality can be proved in an inductive manner 
by induction on n. Its proof is left to the reader. 
Two other examples dealing with PAW-games can be 
found at the end of the next section (see Examples 4.4 and 
4.6). 
4. Coll inearity of values on the class 
of k-coalit ional games 
Driessen and Funaki (1991) introduced the class of"k-co- 
alitional games" and proved that under some additional 
condition, the collinearity between the Shapley value, the 
ENSC-value and the CIS-value holds for such games. The 
goal of this section is to investigate the relationship be- 
tween the classes of k-coalitional games and PAW-games. 
Definition 4.1. Let k be an integer satisfying 1 <k<n-1. 
An n-person game v is called a k-eoalit ional game if it 
satisfies the next two conditions: 
(i) v(S)=v(T) foral l  S, TcNwi th  ISl=lTl<k; 
(ii) There exist numbers ave ~ for all Ts F k and num- 
bers 7k+l, 7~+z . . . . .  ~,_1~  such that 
v(S)= Y, a:r+TIsl (4.1) 
T~F~ ;TcS 
foral l  SeN with k+l<_lSl<n-l.  
This definition could be interpreted as follows. There are 
three types of coalitions in a k-coalitional game; essential 
coalitions, which consist of exactly k players, small coali- 
tions, having less than k players, and large coalitions, with 
more than k players and different from the grand coalition 
N. The numbers aTe ~ represent the maximal profit ob- 
tainable from the formation of the essential coalition T 
within any large coalition. Generally speaking, the worth 
of any large coalition described by (4.1) may be fully in- 
dependent of the worth v (73, TcS, of essential coalitions. 
However, if it happens that the profit aT of any essential 
coalition T for its formation within a large coalition is the 
same as the worth v(T) of the essential coalition in the 
game v, then the worth of any large coalition by (4.1) is 
fully determined by the worth of the essential subcoali- 
tions and the constant corresponding to the size of the large 
coalition. The latter situation is found for example in any 
unanimity game un, RcN, R ,N ,  O. If hRl=k, the unanim- 
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ity game u R is a k-coalitional game, since the conditions 
(4.1) hold with c~ r = u R (7) for all Te F k and 7k+ 1 -= Yk+2 . . . . .  
y.__l=0 and obviously the symmetry conditions for small 
coalitions hold either. 
Now, we treat a preliminary lemma involving k-coali- 
tional games for the sake of comparison with PAW-games. 
We state the lemlna for k-coalitionat games with 
1 <_k<_n-2. First we mention that, in case k=n-  1, we have 
vh=v ~ for all i~N, all l<h<n-1 ,  due to the symmetry, so 
the Shapley value reduces to Shi(v)=n -1 v, ,+(n-1) -1. 
(v,,_1-v~_t) for all is N. This wilt be a result agreeing with 
the last statement in the lemma. 
Lemma 4.2. Let vs G~ be a k-coalitional game such that 
conditions (4.1) hold, where 1 <_k<_n-2. Denote 
(,;) C~ k := ~ a r and 0~ := Y~ ~r  
v~rk r~r~ 
for  all is N. Then, for  all is N, we have 
(i) vh-v~,= k ak -- - 
fo ra l l k+ l<h<n-1  
[( )l( 1 n -1  i (iii) Shl (v) = n -1 vn + k-  1 - vn-i - v~-i ) k 
+k-t(vk--vik). (4.2) 
Proofi (i) Consider a fixed coalition size h satisfying 
k+ 1 _< h_ n -  1. Summing up the relevant equalities in (4.1) 
over all coalitions of size h, we obtain 
~v(S)= ~ I Y. a r+Th]  
s~r,, s~vh LT~rk ;T~S (,,) 
= Z Z ar + rh. 
s~& V~rk ;T~S h 
For a given Ts Fk, the corresponding profit c~r occurs ~,,-k'L \h-k) 
times in the double sum of the expression i the right hand 
side, so the equality reduces to 
s~r;, h -  r~5~ aT + h 7h, or vh = ak + 7h 9 
Similarly, summing up the relevant equalities in (4.1) over 
all coalitions of size h not containing a fixed player ie N, 
we obtain 
sd;i h - k o@ + 7h, or 
v~, = k ak + Th . 
By subtracting the two partial results, we conclude that 
i h i vh--vh--(k ) (O~--ai) for all ieN,  all k+l<h<n-1 .  This 
proves part (i). Part (ii) is a direct consequence of part (i), 
by noting that v ,q -v /  ~=(~-i ~)(c~- ~)  for all is N. 
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(iii) Let is N. Recall that Vh--V~=O for all is N, all 1 <_h<k, 
due to the symmetry property up to size k. From this and 
part (ii), we derive that the Shapley value payoff to player 
i reduces to 
n-I 
h=k+l 
-1 (n -  1"~-1 n-I (h 1 
= n --'r ) h ~+lh-I k \ / 
It remains to prove that 
h_ 1 =k_ 1 n 1 -1  ,o r  
h=k+l 
n-1 /h'~ -1 n -  
h~=kh-tlkl =1~ ( k l l  ; 
but this is a formula which can easily be proved by induc- 
tion on n (n>k+ 1), so that it has been left to the reader at 
the end of the previous ection. 
Note that the results of Lemma 4.2 hold also for k= n '  1, 
as it can be seen by comparing the statement with the re- 
mark preceeding the lemma. Now, the lemma is the main 
tool in proving the central result. 
Theorem 4.3. Let v E G'~, and n > 3. 
(i) Suppose that v is 1-coalitional. Then, v is a PAW-game 
and the cotlinearity properO, holds, namely 
Sh (v)=(n-1) -l (n-2)  ENSC (v )+(n- t )  -I CIS (v). 
Moreover, ENAC (v)=ENSC (v) whenever n>4. 
( ii ) Suppose that v is ( n -  1)-coalitionat. Then, v is a PAW- 
game and the collinearity property holds, namely 
Sh (v) = (n - 1 )-~ ENSC (v) + (n - 1 )-1 (n -  2) CIS (v). 
Moreover, ENAC (v)=CIS (v). 
(iii) Suppose that v is k-coalitional, where 2<k<n-2 .  
Then, the Jbtlowing tht~e statements are equivalent: 
(a) v is a PAW-game; 
(b) there exists a number c k s ~ such that 
i i vk--Vk=C k (vn_ l-v,,_l) ,for all is N ; (4.3) 
(c) the collinearity property holds, namely Sh(v)= 
pENSC(v)  + ( l -p )  CIS(v) with p = k -1 [1 + ck-(n~l)-l], 
where c k is the same number as above. 
Proof (i) Lemma 4.2(ii) applied for k=l yields 
Vh--V~=(n--1) -1 h(vn_l-v~_t) for all i~N, all 2<h<n-1 .  
Thus, conditions (3.1) hold with Ch=(n-t )  -I h for all 
2<h<n-1 .  Hence, v is a PAW-game and the collinearity 
property follows from Theorem 3.3 (ii), where the coeffi- 
cient p is computed by 
n-1 n-1 
p= ~ h - l c  h= ~ (n - l )  - l=(n -1)  - / (n -2 ) .  
h=2 h=2 
Note that if n>_4, then ENACI (v ) -C IS i (v )=(n-2)  -1 (n -  1) 
(Vn_2- -V/_2) :Vn_ l - -Vtn_ l= ENSCi(v)-CISi(v ) for all isN. 
So, ENA C (v) = ENSC (v) if n > 4. 
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(ii) Obviously, (3.1) holds for an (n-1)-coalitional game 
by choosing c~_1=1 and ch=O for all 2<h_<n-2. Thus, v 
is a PAW-game and the collinearity property holds. Note 
that ENA C i (v)- CIS  i (v )  = (n- 2) -1 (n- 1) (vn_ 2- vi_2) ---- 0 for 
all ic N and so, ENAC(v) = CIS (v). 
(iii) In view of Lemma 4.2 (ii), we notice that (3.1) holds 
for all 2<_h<_n-1, h~k, by choosing ch=0 for all 2<h<k, 
and ch=(h) (~l) 1 for all k+l<h<<_n-1. From this it fol- 
lows immediately that (3.1) and (4.3) are equivalent, so 
that the first two statements are equivalent. If (4.3) holds, 
then formula (4.2) for the Shapley value reduces to 
Shi (v) :n - lv~+k -1 l+ck -  (v~<-v~, ,) 
= CIS i (v)+p[ENSCi (v ) -  CISi (1,)] for all ieN; 
therefore, (4.3) implies the collinearity property. To prove 
the converse implication, assume that the collinearity 
property holds, i.e., there exists a number pe E such that 
Sh (v) = CIS (v) + p [ENSC (1,)- CIS (v)]. We have Sh i (v) = 
--1 - t n vn + P (vn-1 - vn-1) for all i ~ N, which together with for- 
mula (4.2) yields that for all ie N 
P(vn-1 i = k_ ~ n 1 
or equivalently 
F fn-l~ < ] 
Thus, (4.3) holds by choosing c,=kp- l+(n-~) -1, pro- 
vided that p is determined by the collinearity property. 
This completes the proof. 
Theorem 4.3 says that all zero-normalized k-coalitional 
games v for which Sh (1,), ENSC (v) and CIS (v) are col- 
linear payoff vectors, are PAW-games. The corresponding 
formulas involving the collinearity of the three vectors 
were proved by Driessen and Funaki (1991) using differ- 
ent methods (see Theorems 6.3, 6.6 and 6.9 there). The 
reader may verify that condition (4.3) is equivalent to the 
corresponding condition of Theorem 6.9 in [4]. We em- 
phasize that the result of Theorem 4.3 (iii) above is more 
precise than the result of Theorem 6.9 in [4], due to the 
fact that condition (4.3) is not only sufficient but also nec- 
essary for the collinearity property of zero-normalized k- 
coalitional games with 2<_k<n-2. 
Now, we present an example of a PAW-game which is 
not k-coalitional for any integer k, 1 -< k -< n -  1. As any PAW- 
game has the collinearity property, a fact shown by Theo- 
rem 3.3, this means that by introducing the PAW-games 
we have enlarged the class of games for which it is known 
that the Shapley value is easily computable due to the col- 
linearity. The example shows also an easy way of using 
Lemma 4.2 for proving that a game is not k-coalitional. 
Example 4.4. Consider the zero-normalized 5-person 
game v given by 
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f i  if I~S, 1,(S) = if leS, and ill= 2, or 4, 
if leS, and ]S] = 3, or 5. 
Straightforward calculations yield all average worth as 
well as all differences of average worth: 
v =0, V3 =~,  
V 4 =~, 1 '1=0, V~----1 V4_vl =4,  V4_v~=51% 
where ie {2, 3, 4, 5}. Obviously, conditions (3.1) hold by 
choosing c2=89 c 3 =-~, c4= 1, hence v is a PAW-game. No- 
tice that Theorem 3.3 (ii) tells us that Sh (v)=ENSC (v), 
_1  1 1 _ because  p-~c2+5c3+-~c4-1. By easy computations we 
obtain 
CIS(v)=2(1, 1, 1, 1, 1), EN~C (v)=~(6, 1, 1, 1, 1), 
ENAC (1,)=(2, O, O, O, 0). 
We get also Sh (1,)=~ENAC (1,)+89 (v). Clearly, the 
game v is neither 3-coalitional nor 4-coalitional because 
the symmetry property does not hold for 2-person coali- 
tions. If the game v would be k-coalitional with k= 1 or k=2, 
then by Lemma 4.2 (ii) we would have 3 _ 1,~ - v~ _ _~_ 
2 v  -v4 
for all ie N. These equalities do not hold for k= 1 or k=2, 
hence our PAW-game is not k-coalitional for any 1 _<k<4. 
Note also another use of Theorem 4.3 (iii) shown by 
the following: 
Example 4.5. Consider once again the zero-normalized 
4-person game v of Example 2.4. This game is a 2-coali- 
tional game with respect o the profits a~2=0, cq3= ~3= 
1 a34=~, C~14=O~24=1 and the constant ?'3=0. Notice that v 
is not a PAW-game because there exists no c2e ~ such that 
i v 2 - v 2 = c 2 (v 3- v~) for all i e N. In view of Theorem 4.3 (iii), 
this fact fully explains why there is no collinearity of the 
payoff vectors Sh (1,), ENSC(v) and CIS (v). 
Example 4.6. Let player 1 be a landowner and players 
2, 3 . . . . .  m+ 1 landless peasants of the same type who have 
nothing to contribute but their labour in order to cultivate 
the land. Let f:{0, 1 . . . . .  m} ~ R be a production func- 
tion, wheref(t)  represents he monetary value of the crop 
of the land cultivated by t peasants, O<t<m, who are hired 
by the landowner. It is supposed that the landowner by 
himself can not produce anything, i ,e. , f (0)=0, and thatf  
is a nondecreasing function, i.e., f ( t+ l )>f  (t) for all 
O<_t<_m-1. This economic situation can be modelled as a 
cooperative (m+l)-person game v with player set N= 
{1, 2, 3 . . . . .  m+ 1 }, m_> 1, whose characteristic function 
v : 2 N ~ [R is given by 
v(S)=0 i f l~S ,  and v(S)=f(ISl-1) i f l eS .  
Thus, the worth of any coalition containing the landowner 
equals the monetary output produced by the peasants in 
the coalition. Any coalition consisting of peasants only has 
no worth, since the peasants do not own any land. Notice 
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that this landlord game vis zero-normalized, i.e., v ({ i }) = 0 
for all ie N. Our purpose is to prove that landlord games 
are PAW-games. In view of (2.7) and (2.8), all average 
worth are 
=(m+l~-l( ml ) f (h_ l )=m~ f(h_l) Vh ~,h)  ~h- 
for all l<h<m+l ;  
(h)-~(m-1)f(h-1)= h~ f(h-1),and v],=O v~ = h-1 m 
for all l<h<m, all ieN\{1}.  Consequently, we have 
9 -h  f (h -1 )  vh-v~- h f (h -1 )  and vh-V ; -m(m+l )  
m+l  
for all l<_h<m, all i eN\{1}.  Thus, conditions (3.1) hold 
hf(h-1) for all 2<h<<_m, provided that with Ch-mf(m_l)  
f (m-1) ;~0 (otherwise, choose Ch=O for all 2<h<<_m). 
Hence, the landlord game v is a PAW-game and due to 
Theorem 3.3 (ii), the col l inearity property holds, that is Sh 
(v)=pENSC (v )+( l -p )  CIS (v), where the coeff icient p is 
computed by 
P= h_lc h = f (h -1)  
h=2 h=2 mf(m-1) =[mf(m-1)]-I t=l ~ f(t) 
provided that f (m-  1)r Obviously, (2.13) yields 
Shl(v)=(m+l) -1 ~ fit) and 
t=0 
m-1 7 
Shi(v)=(m+l)-l[f(m) -m 't~f(t) J  
for all ie N\{ 1 }. General ly speaking, the landlord game v 
is not k-coalit ional for any 3 <k<m, because the symme- 
try property does not hold for 2-person coalit ions. If the 
game v would be k-coalit ional with k=l ,  or k=2, then by 
Lemma 4.2 (ii) we would have 
hf(h-1) _ Vh-V~h _h+l k 
(h+l)f(h) vh+l--v~h+l (h+l) h+l  
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for all ie N, all k+ 1 <_h<m- 1. So, 1-coalit ionality would 
require f (h -1 )=f  (h) for all 2<h<_m-1. Without going 
into technical details, it appears that v is 1-coalit ional iff 
/ ( I ) - - f (2 )  . . . . .  f (m-a) .  
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